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APPLICATION OF THE THIN INCORPORATION
DOCTRINE TO THE SUBCHAPTER S ONE-CLASS-OF-STOCK
REQUIREMENT
The Treasury's recent amendment of its regulation regarding the
treatment of purported debt obligations as a second class of stock
for purposes of Subchapter S election represents a more defensible
interpretation of the statute. However, since the -regulation calls
for an application of the principles of the thin incorporation doc-
trine to an area in which they are seemingly irrelevant, many Sub-
chapter S corporations may be subjected to excessive penalties.
This comment explores the decisional authority preceding the
amendment, and examines the propriety of analyzing the one-class-
of-stock requirement in terms of thin incorporation precepts.
SUBCHAPTER S1 was enacted in an attempt to eliminate the influence
of the federal income tax in the selection of a form of business organi-
zation by according the owners of small businesses an opportunity to
enjoy the advantages of corporate status without the burden of a tax
at both the corporate and shareholder levels.2 Consistent with its
intent to limit the statute's benefits to small businesses, Congress in-
serted in the act several requirements for qualification, one of which
was that an electing corporation may have only one class of stock.y
' INT. RLv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-78. See generally B. BxrrRKE & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS §§ 14.01-.10 (2d ed. 1966),
Braverman, Special Subchapter S Situations-Regulations Run Rampant, 114 U. PA. L.
RFv. 680 (1966); Calkins, How to Use Subchapter S and Section 1244 Without Running
Into Trouble, 15 W. RFs. L. REv. 349 (1964); Caplin, Subchapter S vs. Partnership:
A Proposed Legislative Program, 46 VA. L. REv. 61 (1960); Crumbley, Avoid Un-
intentional Disqualifications of Subchapter S Corporations, 44 TAXES 374 (1966);
Guardino, Tax-Option Corporations, 12 PRAc. LAw., May 1966, at 55; Lourie, Sub-
chapter S After Six Years of Operation: An Analysis of Its Advantages and Defects, 22
J. TAXATION 166 (1965); Nagel, The Tax-Option Corporation-Sections 1371-8 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 44 TAXES 364 (1966); Salkin, What the Courts and the Com-
missioner Have Been Saying About Subchapter S, 24 J. TAXATION 116 (1966); Schwartz,
New Subchapter S Law Passed: Relaxed Rules Require Reexamination of Election, 24
J. TAXATION 370 (1966).
2S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958).
8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371 (a) (4). To be eligible to elect the tax status pro-
vided in Subchapter S, the business entity must be a domestic corporation with only
one class of stock and ten or less shareholders. Id. § 1371 (a) (1). Furthermore, it must
not be a member of an affiliated group of corporations as defined in INT. R v. CODE OF
1954, § 1371 (d). Id. § 1371 (a). All of its shareholders must be individuals or estates,
id. § 1371 (a) (2), and it must not have a nonresident alien as a shareholder, id. § 1371
(a) (3); see B. BrrrKER & J. Eusrncs, supra note 1, at § 14.02.
Subsequent to qualifying for the election under Subchapter S, the corporation must
The statute, however, does not specify the types of financial arrange-
ments which constitute the prohibited second class of stock and
which thus preclude or terminate a Subchapter S election.
To clarify the Subchapter S one-class-of-stock requirement, the
Treasury in 1959 issued an interpretative regulation which stated
that "if an instrument purporting to be a debt obligation is actually
stock, it will constitute a second class of stock." 4 The effect of the
regulation was to expose both the availability and validity of a Sub-
chapter S election to the vagories of the thin incorporation doctrine,
a judicially-created theory by which shareholder loans have fre-
quently been classified as equity capital in order to thwart tax
avoidance.5 There is considerable uncertainty, however, as to the
situations in which courts will apply the thin incorporation doctrine.
The automatic classification of shareholder debt as the prohibited
second class of stock under the 1959 regulation6 significantly increased
the likelihood of an unintentional disqualification by an electing
corporation.
Spurred by several judicial decisions which questioned the auto-
meet the two following year-by-year income requirements: (1) it must derive 20 percent
of its gross receipts from sources within the United States, and (2) no more than 20
percent of its gross receipts can be in the form of passive investment income. The
Internal Revenue Code states that these two conditions are requirements to avoid
termination of a Subchapter S election rather than requirements for qualification. See
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1372 (e) (4)- (5); Treas. Reg. § 1.1372- (b) (4) (1959); Treas.
Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (5) (1965); B. BITrKER & J. EusnicE, supra note 1, at § 14.03.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1 (g), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 Cums. BULL. 321.
"The shareholders of a closely-held corporation often cast part of their investment
in the form of 'debt' for tax rather than business reasons. Because the courts have up-
held the government's refusal to accept the form of the instrument as controlling, there
has been a vast amount of litigation over the proper classification of disputed instru-
ments." B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1, § 4.02 at 121. See generally Gilbert v.
Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957); B. BIrriKR & J. EusTcE, supra §§ 4.02-.06; S.
SuRREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1173-1204 (1960); Caplin, The Caloric
Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17ni INST. o:4 FED. TAX. 771 (1959).
a The 1959 regulation defined classes of stock thus: "A corporation having more
than one class of stock does not qualify as a small business corporation .... If the
outstanding shares of stock of the corporation are not identical with respect to the
rights and interest which they convey in control, profits, and assets of the corporation,
then the corporation is considered to have more than one class of stock. Thus, a
lifference as to voting rights, dividend rights, or liquidation preferences of outstanding
3tock will disqualify a corporation. However, if two or more groups of shares are
identical in every respect except that each group has the right to elect members of the
board of directors in a number proportionate to the number of shares in each group,
they are considered one class of stock. If an instrument purporting to be a debt
obligation is actually stock, it will constitute a second class of stock." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1371-1 (g) (1959) (emphasis added).
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matic classification scheme of the 1959 regulation and one Tax Court
decision 7 which flatly held it invalid, the Treasury recently amended
the regulation to read as follows:
Obligations which purport to represent debt but which actually
represent equity capital will generally constitute a second class of
stock. However, if such purported debt obligations are owned
solely by the owners of the nominal stock of the corporation in sub-
stantially the same proportion as they own such nominal stock,
such purported debt obligations will be treated as contributions to
capital rather than a second class of stock. But, if an issuance,
redemption, sale or other transfer of nominal stock, or of purported
debt obligations which actually represent equity capital, results in a
change in a shareholder's proportionate share of nominal stock
or his proportionate share of such purported debt, a new determina-
tion shall be made as to whether the corporation has more than
one class of stock as of the time of such change.8
An analysis of this modified juxtaposition of the one-class-of-stock
requirement and the thin incorporation doctrine, in terms of the
purpose of Subchapter S and the effect of an election under it, com-
pels the conclusion that the amendment brings the regulation closer
to a defensible interpretation of the statute; nevertheless, the general
propriety of permitting an application of the thin incorporation
doctrine to produce a Subchapter S disqualification is still question-
able.
Cases considering the 1959 version of the regulation offer an
historical, if not analytical, background against which to evaluate
both the applicability of the thin incorporation doctrine to Sub-
chapter S corporations and the recently amended regulation. The
validity of the 1959 regulation was not considered at the court of
appeals level, but two lower court cases did accept the Treasury's
position that debt transformed into equity via the thin incorporation
doctrine automatically created a second class of stock and thereby
terminated a Subchapter S election. In Catalina Homes, Incorpo-
rated9 the Tax Court ruled that unsecured five percent loans without
a fixed maturity date, for which no notes or other evidences of in-
debtedness were issued, and held by the shareholders in proportion
7W. C. Gamman, 46 T.C. 1 (1966).
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1 (g) (1966).
33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1491 (1964).
1204 DUKE L4W JOURNAL [Vol. 1967: 1202
to their stockholdings, 0 created the disqualifying second class. Un-
fortunately, the court considered only those factors relating to the
debt-equity question and did not analyze the more difficult question
of whether this tainted debt constituted a second class of stock for
purposes of Subchapter S. Accepting the Commissioner's classifica-
tion of the debt obligations as stock, the court summarily concluded
that it amounted to a second class of stock because it was preferred
over the no-par common.11
In Henderson v. United States,12 a second case considering the
relevancy of the thin incorporation doctrine to Subchapter S corpora-
ations, a federal district court also held that debt classified as equity
created a second class of stock and disqualified the Subchapter S
election. Since the loans, unsecured eight percent demand notes,
were used to purchase essential operating equipment, were advanced
in proportion to shareholdings, and were not strictly enforced, the
court found that the funds advanced were in fact equity contribu-
tions. In its opinion, the district court did not discusss either
Catalina Homes or the 1959 Treasury regulation, but, like the Tax
Court, concluded summarily that classification of the debt as equity
capital automatically precluded a Subchapter S election.' 3
10 There was some dispute as to whether the shareholders' loans were actually pro-
portional to their stock holdings. The Commissioner alleged that they were propor-
tional, adding to the holdings of the principal shareholders the stock held by members
of their families. Without passing on the Commissioner's allegations, the court held
that proportionality was not determinative on the debt-equity question and did not
even raise the proportionality issue in considering the second class of stock question.
Id. at 1499.
21 The taxpayer did not specifically allege the invalidity of the regulation, but argued
instead that the court should not use the thin incorporation doctrine to transform the
corporation's debts into stock since there were no tax advantages to the Government in
treating interest as dividends if a corporation were taxed under Subchapter S. The
court accepted this proposition, but noted that the taxpayer had not demonstrated that
other individual or corporate tax advantages did not motivate him, and that therefore
his argument was insufficient. The court thus implied that if the taxpayer had con-
sidered all of the possible tax advantages in his own thin incorporation and had shown
their inapplicability to his own Subchapter S election, he might have maintained the
legitimacy of the corporation's debts and thus maintained its Subchapter S status. Id. at
1498.
22 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965). For a criticism of the decision see 38 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 292 (1966).
28 The taxpayer appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit. The Commissioner,
however, on December 19, 1966, after submission of briefs and oral argument, reversed
the effect of the district court's decision by agreeing to pay an administrative refund
in return for the taxpayer's dismissal of the appeal. The Commissioner agreed to the
refund because the loans in Henderson complied with the proportionality requirement
in the new regulation which was to become effective December 28. See note 8 supra and
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In contrast to these earlier cases, a subsequent Tax Court decision
carefully distinguished the second-class-of-stock question from the
debt-equity question and held that the equity created by the thin
incorporation theory represented simply an additional capital
contribution. In W. C. Gamman"4 the majority concluded that
nothing in the 1959 regulation or its legislative history indicated
that the classification of debt as equity capital should automatically
create a second class of stock; therefore, the court continued, the regu-
lation was invalid as applied.'5 Although it questioned the general
applicability of the thin incorporation doctrine to Subchapter S
corporations, the court limited its discussion to the proportional
debt-equity arrangement in the case before it.' Considering the
Commissioner's second-class-of-stock argument apart from the regu-
lation, the court suggested that the one-class-of-stock restriction was
inserted in Subchapter S to minimize complexities that could arise
from distributing corporate earnings to shareholders with differing
rights and obligations.' 7 No distribution problem existed in Gamman
because the debt obligations were held entirely by the stockholders
and in proportion to their stock. Following the Gamman result,
but without offering the same extensive discussion, the Tax Court in
Lewis Building & Supplies, Incorporated' again ruled that share-
holder non-interest bearing demand notes were capital contribu-
tions. Although the ratios of the shareholders' debts to their equity
holdings were not as closely proportional in Lewis as in Gamman,'9
accompanying text; Letter From Edward W. Wadsworth, Clerk, Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, to the Duke Law Journal, Jan. 30, 1967.
2146 T.C. 1 (1966).
Is Id. at 8.
2 Id. at 11. .
2 Id. at 7. The Gamman court distinguished Catalina Homes and Henderson on
the ground that the regulation was not challenged in those cases. However, it has been
suggested that the court's willingness to look beyond the agreement to see that there
was really no preference is what actually distinguished the case from Catalina Homes.
Rewrite Bulletin No. 22-123, CCH 1966 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 8533.28 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 949 (1966).
19 A pair of shareholders owning 700 shares advanced the corporation $12,500 and
another pair of shareholders owning 300 shares advanced $6,000. Id. at 953. The
Commissioner might have argued that this disproportion of equity to debt holdings
created a relationship between the two groups as debt-holders that was different from
their relationship as shareholders, thus creating a potential problem in the distribu-
tion of earnings once the debts were classified as stock. Such an argument would not
be inconsistent with Gamman since the debt-equity ratios in that case were exact. See
note 16 supra. See also Seven Sixty Ranch Co. v. Kennedy, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,608
(D. Wyo. 1966).
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the Commissioner, avoiding the argument that the rights of the
shareholders were altered by their debt holdings, merely asserted the
validity of the regulation. In rejecting the Commissioner's con-
tentions, the court concluded that Gamman was indistinguishable.20
The amended version of the regulation has been tailored to per-
mit a Subchapter S election where, as in Gamman, shareholders hold
debt obligations in amounts essentially proportional to their stock-
holdings.21 Since a proportional debt-equity arrangement constitutes
the most widely used method of financing closely held corporations
with shareholder-owned debt,22 the likelihood of unintentional dis-
qualification has been decreased. Further, by retaining the general
proposition that tainted shareholder debt will generally constitute a
second class of stock, the regulation contemplates disqualification in
those situations which actually present the allocation of income
difficulties which the Gamman court regarded as the provocation for
the one-class-of-stock requirement. At the same time, by providing
20 Despite the persuasiveness of the Gamman opinion and the subsequent decisions
following it, an argument in favor of upholding the 1959 regulation is not altogether
without merit. A court might have accepted the classification of all disallowed debt
as a second class of stock even without the specific authorization of the regulation.
Since nominal debt usually differs in its terms from common stock, but frequently
resembles cumulative, non-participating, redeemable preferred stock, it is arguable
that tainted shareholder debt should be automatically treated as preferred stock. See
W. C. Gamman, 46 T.C. 1, 13-14 (1966) (dissenting opinion). The specific authoriza-
tion of the 1959 regulation, with the presumption in favor of its validity, simply adds
additional weight to such a classification. The regulation is arguably a reasonable
exercise of the Commissioner's authority since the statute, despite a reference to share-
holder loans, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1374 (c) (2), 1376, says nothing about excessi ve
shareholder debt. Furthermore, Congress subsequently amended the statute, e.g.,
Revenue Act of 1962 § 23, 76 Stat. 960; Revenue Act of 1964 § 233, 78 Stat. 19, without
nullifying the Treasury's interpretation, an act frequently interpreted to indicate con-
gressional approval. See Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114-15
(1939).
21 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
22 See RIA, TAX COORDINATOR D-1505, at 105 (1967). In a closely held corpora-
tion the issuance of debt obligations for shareholder advances has several tax ad-
vantages. First, interest paid on the debt obligations are deductible by the corpora-
tion. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163. If the distributions were in the form of divi-
dends the corporation would lose its deduction but the shareholder would be slightly
benefited since he could deduct the first one hundred dollars. Id. § 116. Secondly,
if the business prospers the corporation can retire its debt obligations, thus removing
earnings from the corporation to the shareholder who will not be taxed since they are
a return of his investment and not a dividend. 1 F. O'NAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 2.09,
at 55 (1958). Thirdly, by accumulating reserves to retire its debt obligations, the
corporation may avoid the surtax on accumulated earnings. Id. Finally, if the corpo-
ration fails the shareholder-creditor will receive a partial bad debt deduction and not
just a capital loss. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166. But see note 25 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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for a "new determination" rather than an automatic disqualification
when the proportionality of the debt-equity structure is disturbed,
the amended regulation offers some hope that other financial arrange-
ments which do not pose distribution difficulties may also be ex-
cepted.
Because the defect in the 1959 regulation which prompted the
result in Gamman may be of a more fundamental nature than the
Treasury has contemplated, the simple expedient of engrafting a
single exception upon its central proposition may not be curative.
The principal weakness in the amended regulation is the continued
use of definitions of "stock" and "debt" borrowed from the thin in-
corporation doctrine, appropriate only in the context of preventing
tax avoidance. Furthermore, even if application of the thin in-
corporation doctrine should be necessary to prevent the abuses of
shareholder-debt financing, the statutory purposes of Subchapter S
and the one-class-of-stock requirement give no justification for penal-
izing an electing corporation with termination of its election in addi-
tion to the disallowance of its excessive shareholder debt. Therefore,
the amended regulation, by permitting disqualification for excessive
non-proportional shareholder debt, would appear unnecessarily re-
strictive and an inaccurate interpretation of the statute.
Application of the thin incorporation doctrine in the Subchapter
S context is necessary only to prevent tax abuses made possible be-
cause corporate distributions to holders of debt are taxed differently
than distributions to holders of equity.23 The theory, as applied by
the courts, will prohibit an interest deduction by a corporation in
situations in which nominal interest payments to equity holders
actually represent a distribution of earnings. Similarly precluded
by application of the doctrine is withdrawal of earnings as repay-
ments of principal rather than as dividends-a scheme intended to
avoid taxation of these amounts at the shareholder level.24 In their
efforts to distinguish the thinly capitalized corporation from the
28 See note 5 supra and accompanying text; note 22 supra.
2" Another advantage to a "thin" capital structure is that the necessity for repaying
the loan provides a defense against the assessment of an accumulated earnings tax.
Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 771
(1959); Garver, Closely Held Businesses, Tax Factors Affecting Debt-Equity Financing
For a New Small Corporation, 17 W. Ras. L. REv. 773, 777 (1966). However, any ad-
vantage to thin incorporation exists only if profits exist in the corporation, since any
cash distribution by a deficit corporation is treated as a return of capital, not a dividend.
Treas. Reg. § 1.316- (1) (a) (2) (1955).
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legitimately financed corporation the courts have examined such
factors as the proportionality of shareholder debt to stockholdings,
the actual ratio of corporate debt to stated equity, whether the
proceeds have been utilized to purchase "essential" assets, and
whether the parties had a genuine intent to create a debtor-creditor
relationship.2 5 Of particular interest to courts evaluating the legiti-
macy of a shareholder loan are provisions for payment of interest.
If interest will be paid even in periods of earnings insufficient to
justify dividend distribution, some courts consider this significant
in preventing a debt to equity transformation. 2 Unfortunately,
since the weight to be given a combination of the above factors by
a particular court cannot be predicted, taxpayers are unable to
determine the precise extent to which their corporations may be
safely financed with shareholder debt. Due to the disparity in con-
sequence, this uncertainty, of course, constitutes a greater hazard to
the Subchapter S corporation than to a non-electing corporation.
Positing that the only essential difference between two hypothetical
corporations is that one has elected Subchapter S treatment, the
non-electing corporation and its shareholders have little to lose by
capitalizing heavily with shareholder-owned debt, since the tax status
of this arrangement may be easily tested by a claim for an interest
deduction. If the debt is disallowed and transformed under the thin
incorporation doctrine into equity, the owners of the business are in
no worse position than if they had capitalized the corporation en-
tirely with stock. On the other hand, the Subchapter S corporation
which is deemed to have excessive non-proportional shareholder debt
would not only have the debts disallowed but also would find its
optional tax treatment terminated. Since a post-termination distri-
bution of previously taxed but undistributed earnings wil] be taxed
2 B. BrrTxER & J. EuSTiCE, supra note 1, at 124-27. The writer of one exhaustive
study suggests that the courts originally looked at the intent of the parties, gradually
turned to a strict ratio test, and now have returned to the "intent-of-the-parties" test.
Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
771 (1959). Even when using the supposedly subjective "intent" standard, however,
the courts have often used some of the more objective criteria to decide whether this
intent existed. Aarons, Debt v. Equity: Special Hazards in Setting Up the Corporate
Capital Structure, 23 J. TAXATION 194 (1965); see Montclair, Inc. v. Commissioner, 318
F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963); Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1962);
Gerver, De-emphasis of Debt-Equity Test for Thin Corporations Requires New Defense
Tactics, 23 J. TAXATION 28 (1965). A summary of the tests presently being used by the
courts can be found in RIA, TAX COOaDNATOR K-5100 to K-5120.
26 See, e.g., Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935).
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again to the shareholder to the extent of any accumulated earnings
and profits, such a termination may constitute a severe penalty.a2
Thus, while it is generally advisable for an electing corporation to
distribute income currently, such a procedure presents practical
difficulties. For instance, due to the inability of some corporations
to accurately estimate income until the latter half of the tax year,
funds to make current distributions in an amount equal to taxable
income may be lacking. Further, a corporation may require all or
part of the income to finance future business activities, 2 thereby
rendering total current distribution undesirable.
The taxing scheme employed in Subchapter S suggests, first,
that its framers did not intend that the thin incorporation doctrine
would effect such a severe consequence as the termination of a Sub-
chapter S election, and, secondly, that application of the thin in-
corporation doctrine, as a practical matter, would be unnecessary in
most Subchapter S situations. By providing taxpayers an oppor-
tunity to select a form of organization without regard to tax con-
siderations, Congress in essence legalized the principal objective
of thin incorporation-that is, the avoidance of a tax at both the
corporate and shareholder levels. This end is accommplished under
Subchapter S by eliminating the tax on a qualified electing corpora-
tion. No advantage accrues to the shareholder of an electing corpo-
ration in withdrawing earnings as a return of principal, since the
earnings are taxed to the shareholders at individual rates irrespective
of withdrawal.9 Similarly, there can be no advantage to the share-
holder who claims a deduction on the corporate return for interest
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b) (1959). A major problem peculiar to operating under
Subchapter S relates to the difficulties in withdrawing previously taxed income, i.e.,
income of an electing corporation that is not distributed during the taxable year and
that is, therefore, taxed to the shareholders at the end of the year as a constructive
dividend. This P.T.I. (previously taxed income) cannot be withdrawn tax-free in a
later year unless all current earnings and profits for such later year are first distributed.
Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2 (a) (1955). Moreover, after the election is terminated the special
rule of permitting the tax-free distribution of P.T.I. is no longer operative; thus, gen-
eral corporate rules apply and distributions by the corporation of P.T.I. after termina-
tion are taxable as dividends to the extent of both current and accumulated earnings
and profits. Note, "Locked-In Earnings'-How Serious a Problem under Subchapter
S?, 49 VA. L. REV. 1516, 1522-23 (1963) (detailed analysis with examples).
28 To escape the problem of distributing all of its income currently, an electing
corporation will usually distribute its taxable income to the shareholders, who then
lend it back to the corporation. However, this again raises the problem that these
loans will be classified as risk capital and disallowed via the thin incorporation doctrine.
29 Garver, supra note 24, at 779.
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on shareholder-owned debt, because these amounts if received by the
shareholder-creditor would be taxed to him as interest or, if not re-
ceived, as a share of the undistributed income of the corporation
under section 1373.30 Although there still exist situations in which
a "thin" capital structure and the Subchapter S form might be
combined in an unauthorized tax avoidance attempt,31 application
of the thin incorporation doctrine could be reasonably limited to
situations in which attempts at tax avoidance in fact existed. Fur-
thermore, even in these instances, the effect of the doctrine should
be merely to prevent specific abuses and not to disqualify the entire
election.3 2
An examination of the statutory purpose behind the one-class-of-
stock requirement also tends to establish that classification of share-
holder loans as equity should not create a second class of stock. The
one-class-of-stock requirement is not aimed at the prevention of tax
avoidance, but rather represents a congressional attempt to avoid
complexities in the allocation of earnings to shareholders with differ-
'0 INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 1373. Also. there would be no accumulated earnings.
Garver, supra note 24, at 779.
81 Application of the thin incorporation doctrine might still be necessary to prevent
tax abuses if the shareholders attempted to take advantage of the "thin" structure
either before the Subchapter S election or after its termination. Also, there are ad-
vantages to a thinly capitalized Subchapter S corporation even during a year in which
the election is in effect if the corporation desires to distribute accumulated earnings.
If accumulated before the shareholders elected Subchapter S, these earnings would have
been taxed at the corporate level, but not at the shareholder level, and their distribu-
tion to the shareholders as a return of principal would constitute the same abuse as if
they had been distributed by a normal corporation. Although application of the
thin incorporation doctrine would seem appropriate in this situation, the disallowed
debt should be treated as an additional contribution to capital rather than as a dis-
qualifying second class of stock.
In other situations the combination of Subchapter S and a large shareholder debt
might be beneficial to the stockholder. It has been suggested, for example, that the
interplay of § 1232, which allows capital gains treatment upon the retirement of corpo-
rate obligations, and § 1376, which permits the shareholder to deduct his proportionate
amount of the corporation's net operating loss, might enable a high-bracket taxpayer to
deduct a corporate loss from his ordinary income, reduce the basis of his corporate debt,
and then have the gain on the retirement of the debt treated as capital gain rather than
ordinary income. Rewrite Bulletin, supra note 17. However, this advantage seems to
be offset by the possibility that the corporation's losses will exceed the combined bases
of the stockholders' debt and stock, with the result that this excess would never
be deductible either as an ordinary loss or as a capital loss. See INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 1374 (c) (2); W. C. Gamman, 46 T.C. I, 11 (1966). See generally B. BIT=EER &
J. EuSTICE, supra note 1, at 729-31.
32 Application of the thin incorporation doctrine to Subchapter S corporations has
been questioned in other sources. See Aarons, supra note 25, at 194; Braverman, supra
note 1, at 684.
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ing rights and obligations3 8 While this consideration is not extensive-
ly discussed in the legislative history of the 1958 Act, a report of the
Senate Finance Committee,8 4 which drafted a similar provision in
1954, more clearly reveals this motivation. If dividends in excess of
current earnings were paid to preferred shareholders, these persons
would receive amounts which had been previously taxed to both the
common and preferred shareholders but left in the corporation, since
the earnings of a Subchapter S corporation are taxed to the share-
holders without regard to actual distributions. In order to keep
the common stockholders from bearing a disproportionate tax bur-
den, a deduction would have to be accorded to the owners of common
stock. Allocation of such a deduction would be difficult, especially
if any of the common shares had been transferred during the interval
between the original taxation of the earnings and the distribution
to the preferred shareholders. The one-class-of-stock requirement
thus represents a congressional decision to avoid such difficulties
rather than draft intricate and perhaps arbitrary rules for their solu-
tion.
The relevant inquiry must be whether classification of shareholder
debt as stock creates the distribution difficulties sought to be avoided
by Congress. It might appear that the same difficulties are created
in allocation of the tax burden, since the thin incorporation doctrine
transforms the debt into a class of stock with rights demonstrably
different than those of the common stock. However, in the typical
case of a thinly capitalized close corporation, where the debt is held
solely by shareholders essentially in proportion to their stock hold-
ings, a distribution problem cannot arise, since any preference for
the shareholder as creditor is merely a preference over himself as
shareholder. 5 Therefore, the distinction in the amended regulation
.. See A. & N. Furniture & Appliance Co. v. United States, P-H 1967 FED. TAX SERv.
(19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1485) 67-607 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 1967).
81 S. RP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 453-54 (1954);
as See note 17 supra and accompanying text. In A. & N. Furniture & Appliance Co.
v. United States, P-H 1967 FED. TAx SERV. (19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1485) 67-607 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 24, 1967), an electing corporation qualified despite the existence of a voting
trust which the Government alleged created a second class of stock. The court con-
cluded that since the voting trust did not increase the size of the corporation or com-
plicate corporate distributions, the election was valid. The court articulated the
following reason for the one-class-of-stock requirement: "It was thought that the com-
plexity involved in passing the earnings of a corporation through to its shareholders,
where the stock of the corporation is held by a widely diversified group of shareholders,
between proportional and non-proportional debt-equity arrange-
ments is defensible as an attempt to permit arrangements in which
the preferences are illusory and to condemn schemes in which dis-
tribution difficulties would arise.
The proportionality test, however, creates a number of difficulties
for the taxpayer. First, a question is raised by the doctrine enunci-
ated in Murphy Logging Company v. United States:8 6 shareholder-
guaranteed bank loans to a thinly capitalized corporation are to be
treated as loans from the shareholders individually under the thin
incorporation doctrine. If courts were to accept this principle when
considering a Subchapter S corporation's satisfaction of the one-class-
of-stock requirement, the danger that shareholder-guaranteed debts
will be classified as a second class of stock is increased. The share-
holders, though arranging direct loans in proportion to their share-
holdings, may not be so careful to prorate their guarantees of outside
loans.37 Secondly, the distinction between proportional and non-
proportional debt-holdings creates a dilemma for electing corpora-
tions when coupled with the present uncertainty of the thin in-
corporation tests. Since the proportionality of shareholder debt to
stockholdings is one factor leading the courts to find that debt is
actually equity, making the loans proportional as the amended regu-
lation requires would actually increase the likelihood that a court
would initially classify the debt as stock.38 Thirdly, loans, unlike
equity shares, generally possess maturity or redemption character-
istics which may lead to alteration of originally proportional debt-
equity holdings. Thus, if shareholder A's loans are repaid prior to
created accounting complications which were too great a burden for the government
to bear, and thus the restrictions as to one class of stock." Id. at 1489.
302 39 F. Supp. 794 (D. Ore. 1965). Contra, Fors Farms, Inc. v. United States, 17
Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 222 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
87In a case actually involving a Subchapter S corporation and shareholder-guaran-
teed bankloans, however, the taxpayer argued that the shareholder-guaranteed loans
should be treated as shareholder debt in order to increase the adjusted basis of his own
corporate debt and thus permit a larger net operating loss deduction. William H. Perry,
47 T.C. 159 (1966); see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1374 (c) (2). The court rejected this
contention and held that his secondary liability was not enough to constitute actual
debt. 47 T.C. at 164. The case did not raise any second-class-of-stock questions, but
the Commissioner's position suggests that Murphy Logging Co. may not be applied to
Subchapter S corporations. RIA, TAX COORDINATOR K-5118.1, at 32,159 (1967).
38 Although the shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation would not usually have
any incentive for creating a large amount of shareholder debt, a thin incorporation
would be of advantage if the shareholders switched back and forth between the Sub-
chapter S and the normal corporate form. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
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the satisfaction of obligations held by shareholder B, the propor-
tionality required by the regulation may be destroyed.89 While
original incorporators can now anticipate this difficulty, currently
electing entities may be precluded from continued participation in
Subchapter S provisions. Finally, proportionality is not an unam-
biguous concept. If one shareholder is unable to supply his share of
the capital, he may borrow from another shareholder and in turn lend
to the corporation-a transaction which the Commissioner might treat
as a contribution from the original supplier of the capital.
Taxpayer difficulties in the treatment of shareholder debt as a
second class of stock arose because the Treasury transferred the labels
of the thin incorporation doctrine to an area of the law in which
they simply were not relevant. The classification of debt as stock
to prevent possible abuses in the distribution of corporate earnings
should not necessitate the transformation of that debt for all sub-
sequent judicial definitions of the word "stock."40  The thin in-
corporation doctrine is not a statutory requirement, but a common
law fiction whose terms are applicable only in the context of pre-
venting specific attempts at tax avoidance. The Treasury's failure
to recognize the limits of the doctrine accounts for the excessive
penalty to which any Subchapter S corporation might now be sub-
jected.
The ultimate source of the problem created by the regulation,
however, is not merely the similarity of terms between the thin in-
corporation doctrine and the requirements of Subchapter S, but
rather Congress' failure to close the loopholes existing in the statutes.
Both the different treatment of corporate distributions to share-
holders and creditors and the optional feature of Subchapter S, allow-
ing the taxpayer to switch back and forth between the normal and
the Subchapter S corporation, provide a basic framework within
which the taxpayer can manipulate his business structure to achieve
unintended tax advantages. Until one or both of these large areas is
restricted, problems in the taxation of thinly incorporated Subchapter
S corporations will probably continue.
39 See RIA, TAX COORDINATOR D-1505, at 18,064 (1967).
40 See Campbell v. Carter Foundation Prod. Co., 322 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1963). The
court held that installment notes given by a corporation to its sole shareholder were
"debt" for the purposes of interest deductions by the corporation, but were "equity" for
the purposes of establishing a substituted basis under § 351.
1214 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1967: 1202
